Inheritance Act Claim Time Limit UK (2026): The 6-Month Deadline and How to Apply for an Extension

The time limit for applications under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 is strict and unforgiving: (1) THE STATUTORY TIME LIMIT: IPFDA 1975 s.4(1) — 'Except with the permission of the court, an application for an order under section 2 of this Act shall not, after the end of the period of six months from the date on which representation with respect to the estate of the deceased is first taken out, be made to the court'. Six months from the date on which representation is first taken out; (2) 'REPRESENTATION IS FIRST TAKEN OUT': the clock starts from the date on which the grant of probate or the grant of letters of administration is first issued by the Probate Registry — NOT the date of death; NOT the date the applicant became aware of the death or the will; NOT the date the applicant first received legal advice. PRACTICAL EXAMPLE: person dies on 01 January 2026. Probate granted on 01 April 2026. The 6-month clock starts on 01 April 2026. Deadline: 01 October 2026. Regardless of when the applicant learned about the estate; (3) WHAT 'REPRESENTATION' COVERS: (a) probate of a will; (b) letters of administration (on intestacy); (c) letters of administration with will annexed (where the named executor cannot act); (d) grants sealed in Northern Ireland or Scotland and re-sealed in England and Wales (the 6 months runs from the original grant date); (4) WHERE NO GRANT HAS BEEN ISSUED: if no grant has been taken out (small estate administered without probate; or delays in applying), the 6-month clock has not started. In practice, a potential applicant may need to prompt the personal representatives to apply for a grant — or apply for a grant themselves (any 'person interested in the estate' may apply for a grant) — to start the limitation period running; (5) THE CAVEAT STRATEGY: a potential applicant who knows of the death but not yet the will (and therefore cannot assess their claim) may enter a caveat at the Probate Registry. A caveat prevents the grant being issued — the 6-month clock cannot start while the caveat is in force. This buys time. However, caveats are temporary (6 months; renewable) and the personal representatives can issue a warning — if not answered, the caveat lapses.

This is the question that catches many potential applicants out — a letter before action does NOT stop the clock: (1) THE CLEAR RULE: the 6-month time limit under IPFDA 1975 s.4 runs until 'an application' is made 'to the court'. An application to the court means ISSUING PROCEEDINGS — filing a claim form (N1 or N2) at the court and paying the court fee. Any step short of issuing proceedings does NOT stop the clock; (2) WHAT DOES NOT STOP THE CLOCK: (a) sending a letter before action to the personal representatives or solicitors threatening an Inheritance Act claim; (b) instructing solicitors to negotiate on your behalf; (c) entering into mediation or alternative dispute resolution; (d) corresponding with the estate about a possible settlement; (e) filing an official caveat at the Probate Registry; (f) making a demand on the estate; (3) WHAT DOES STOP THE CLOCK: issuing a claim form in the Family Division (if there is or was a marriage/civil partnership connection) or the Chancery Division (most other claims) of the High Court, or in the County Court (claims below £350,000). The claim form must be stamped and date-sealed by the court — this is the moment of issue; (4) THE PRACTICAL DANGER: many potential applicants and even some solicitors believe that writing 'we will issue proceedings unless we hear from you by X date' stops the clock. It does not. If the 6-month deadline passes without a claim form being issued, the applicant is out of time and requires the court's permission to proceed — which is not freely given; (5) BEST PRACTICE FOR APPLICANTS APPROACHING THE DEADLINE: if negotiations are ongoing but the 6-month deadline is approaching, issue proceedings and then seek a stay (pause) in the proceedings while negotiations continue. This protects the time limit without forcing the litigation forward. The claim is issued, the clock is stopped, and the parties can continue to talk. Issue first; negotiate second.

The court has discretion to permit a late application under IPFDA 1975 s.4 but exercises this discretion cautiously: (1) THE DISCRETION: s.4(1) provides that applications outside 6 months require 'the permission of the court'. This is a genuine discretion — it is not automatic; the applicant must make a specific application to the court for permission to proceed out of time; (2) THE RE SALMON FACTORS: the leading case on extensions is Re Salmon [1980] 1 Ch 167 (Megarry V-C), which identified the key factors the court should consider: (a) THE LENGTH OF THE DELAY: how far out of time is the application? A few days' delay is easier to excuse than a year; (b) THE REASON FOR THE DELAY: was the delay due to the applicant's failure to act, or due to circumstances outside their control (illness; mental incapacity; failure of the solicitor; not knowing of the death or the will; difficulties in obtaining the grant)? (c) THE MERITS OF THE CLAIM: is there a prima facie meritorious claim? The court will be more willing to extend if the underlying claim appears strong; (d) THE POSITION OF THE ESTATE: has the estate already been distributed to third parties who would suffer if an order were now made? Distribution after the 6-month period significantly reduces the prospect of an extension; (e) PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT: would the potential beneficiaries suffer prejudice if extension were granted — particularly if they have already received and spent their inheritance; (f) THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES: were both parties acting responsibly? Did the potential defendant lead the applicant to believe no claim would be necessary (estoppel by conduct); (3) HOW THE COURT APPLIES THE FACTORS: no single factor is decisive. The court balances all circumstances. In practice, extension is more likely where: the estate has not been distributed; the delay was short and due to circumstances beyond the applicant's control; negotiations were ongoing; and there is a clear and strong claim; (4) CASE EXAMPLES: (a) Bhusate v Patel [2020] EWCA Civ 1) — Court of Appeal confirmed that substantial delay (11 years) could still be excused where the estate had been wrongly administered; strong merits and lack of prejudice compensated for length of delay; (b) Re Dennis [1981] 2 All ER 140 — delay of 15 months; extension refused because estate had been distributed and beneficiaries would be prejudiced; (c) Stock v Brown [1994] 1 FLR 840 — delay of 12 months; extension granted where the delay arose from ongoing negotiations and the estate had not been distributed.

Personal representatives who wait to distribute until after the 6-month period has expired can claim significant (but not absolute) protection: (1) THE IPFDA 1975 s.20 PROTECTION: 'Where an order is made under section 2 of this Act, any person who has in good faith and for valuable consideration paid the whole or part of the estate to a person entitled thereto shall not be required to see to the application of the money paid'. More specifically, s.20 provides that a personal representative who has distributed the estate (in good faith; without notice of any application or of any intention to make an application; after the end of the period permitted for making an application) is not personally liable to provide for the applicant from their own assets; (2) THE PRACTICAL EFFECT: if the PR distributes the estate after 6 months from the grant and before receiving notice of any claim or intended claim, the PR is safe. The applicant can only pursue the BENEFICIARIES who received the estate assets — not the PR personally; (3) THE CAVEAT — NOT ABSOLUTE PROTECTION: the s.20 protection is subject to important qualifications: (a) if the PR has received actual notice of an intended claim (a letter; a conversation; anything that puts the PR on notice that a potential applicant may claim), the protection is lost; (b) a court can still order the estate assets back from the beneficiaries (who are required to account) — the protection is personal to the PR, not a bar to the substantive claim; (c) the beneficiaries must give back assets to satisfy a court order if extension is granted and the claim succeeds; (4) PRACTICAL STEPS FOR PRs: (a) wait at least 6 months from the date of the grant before any distribution; (b) where there is any prospect of a claim (known disputes; known dependants; known cohabitants), wait 6 months even if no letter has been received; (c) serve a statutory advertisement (Trustee Act 1925 s.27 — London Gazette and local newspaper) to protect against unknown creditors and potential claimants; (d) document all distributions carefully with dates and values — essential if the PR's good faith is later challenged; (5) THE INTERPLAY WITH EXTENSION: even if the PR has distributed, a court may still grant a late application and order the beneficiaries to account. The key protection for PRs (not beneficiaries) is the s.20 personal protection.

The IPFDA 1975 defines who can apply and what they must establish: (1) ELIGIBLE APPLICANTS (IPFDA 1975 s.1): (a) the spouse or civil partner of the deceased (even if separated but not divorced at the date of death); (b) a former spouse or civil partner of the deceased who has not remarried or formed a new civil partnership; (c) a person who, during the whole of the period of 2 years ending immediately before the death of the deceased, was living in the same household as the deceased as if the deceased's husband/wife or civil partner (i.e. cohabitants of 2 years); (d) a child of the deceased (including adult children and children of any marriage); (e) any person not a child of the deceased who was treated by the deceased as a child of the family (in relation to any marriage or civil partnership of the deceased, or any family in which the deceased stood in the role of a parent); (f) any other person who immediately before the death of the deceased was being maintained wholly or partly by the deceased; (2) THE TEST — REASONABLE FINANCIAL PROVISION: the court must be satisfied that the disposition of the estate does not make 'reasonable financial provision' for the applicant. 'Reasonable provision' is the objective standard: for a surviving spouse/civil partner: 'such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for a husband or wife to receive, whether or not that provision is required for his or her maintenance' — the MAINTENANCE-PLUS STANDARD; for all others: 'such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for the applicant to receive for his maintenance' — the MAINTENANCE STANDARD; (3) FACTORS (IPFDA 1975 s.3): in exercising its powers, the court has regard to: (a) the financial resources and financial needs of the applicant (now and in the foreseeable future); (b) the financial resources and needs of other applicants and beneficiaries; (c) the obligations and responsibilities of the deceased to the applicant and beneficiaries; (d) the size and nature of the estate; (e) the physical or mental disability of the applicant or beneficiaries; (f) any other matter the court considers relevant (including the applicant's conduct); (4) WHAT THE COURT CAN ORDER: periodical payments; lump sum; transfer of property; settlement of property; acquisition of property for the applicant's benefit; variation of settlement; (5) INTERACTION WITH THE WILL: a successful Inheritance Act claim does NOT invalidate the will. The will remains valid and the court makes an order out of the estate over and above what the will provides (or in substitution for the inadequate provision in the will or intestacy).